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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
JASON B. PARKIN, : Appellate Case No. 20060530-CA 
Defendant/Appellate. : Trial Court Case No. 041500254FS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2004). 
On May 3,2006, Appellant was convicted pursuant to a conditional plea agreement by 
the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah of 
possession of a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii). (R. 118-20). Copies of the judgment and the Order 
denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support are in Addendum 
A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred by failing to find whether Mr. Parkin was in 
custody and interrogated for Miranda purposes without the procedural protection of a 
Miranda warning? 
Standard of review: "A trial court's application of the legal concept of custodial 
interrogation to the facts of a particular case presents a mixed question of fact and law." 
State v. Levin, — P.3d —, 2006 UT 50, %4 (Utah 2006). Questions implicating Fifth 
Amendment Miranda protections are reviewed for correctness." Id. at f 45. 
Preservation: The Miranda issue was preserved by Mr. Parkin's Motion to 
Suppress and during the suppression hearing on the matter. (R. 41-6, 48-9). Moreover, 
the trial court made findings of fact consistent with findings to determine whether 
Spencer was subject to a custodial interrogation. (R. 79-86). 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to find whether 
Mr. Parkin was in custody and interrogated for Miranda purposes without the procedural 
protection of a Miranda warning? 
Standard of review: "Plain error is a question of law reviewed for correctness." 
State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222,1f 7, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Preservation: Should this Court find that Appellant did not sufficiently preserve 
the Miranda issue for appeal, this Court should hear it based on the plain error doctrine. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (concluding that plain error 
standard of review applies to issues not preserved for appeal); State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 
951, 1999 UT 59, U 30 (Utah 1999) (court will consider plain error on appeal). 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred by finding that Appellant's consent was 
freely and voluntarily given without coercion? 
Standard of review: In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and its factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-939, n.4 (Utah 1994); State v. Veteto, 6 P.3d 
1133,1135,2000 UT 62, H 8 (Utah 2000). 
Preservation. The Conditional Plea Agreement specifically reserved the 
Appellant's right to appeal the District Court's denial of his pretrial Motion to Suppress. 
See State v. Seary, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This issue was also 
preserved below at a suppression hearing held on August 22, 2005 (R. 41-46) and by 
written motions filed on August 15, 2005, and December 6,2005. (R. 48-49, 65-75). 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule on whether exigent 
circumstances existed to justify Spencer's warrantless search? 
Standard of Review: "The determination of whether exigent circumstances existed 
is a question of fact, which should not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." 
State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.3d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)). 
Preservation: This state constitutional issue was preserved in Appellant's Motion 
to Suppress and Appellant's Reply Memorandum. (R. 41-6, 65-75). It was also 
preserved during oral argument. (R.77-78). During oral argument ("OA") defense 
counsel argued, "[Under] Utah law [ ] a warrantless automobile search requires probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. . . Now there was absolutely no testimony of any 
exigent circumstances, quite the contrary." (OA: 58). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES. RULES 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions is in 
Addendum B: 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14; 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV; 
United States Constitution, Amendment V; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state filed an Information on December 17, 2004, charging 
Appellant/Defendant Jason B. Parkin ("Parkin" or "Appellant") with one count of 
possession of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(b)(ii); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of § 58-37a-5; and one count of possession of a controlled substance, to wit, 
cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (2004). 
(R. 3-5). A preliminary hearing was held on May 3, 2005, and the case was bound over. 
(R. 27-28). On August 15, 2005, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum 
in Support. (R. 41-46). A suppression hearing was conducted on August 22, 2005. (R. 
48-49). On November 9, 2005, the state filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 58-64). On December 6, 2005, Appellant filed his 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 65-75). Oral 
argument was heard on December 13, 2005, and the court took the matter under 
advisement. (R. 77-78). On December 14, 2005, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck issued an 
Order denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 79-86). 
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On March 21, 2006, Appellant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 
to wit, cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) 
(2004). (R. 102-12). The Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit 
County, State of Utah entered a judgment for Appellant's conviction of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, to wit cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) on May 3, 2006. (R. 118-20). Appellant received a sentence of 
zero to five (5) years at the Utah State Prison. The sentence was stayed upon twenty-four 
(24) months probation with Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 114-17). Appellant filed a 
timely notice of appeal on June 1, 2006. (R. 121-22). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to testimony taken at a suppression hearing ("SH") on or about 
December 6, 2004, Trooper Seth Spencer ("Spencer") of the Utah Highway Patrol 
testified that at approximately 6:30 p.m. he arrived at the scene of a traffic accident that 
had occurred on SR-248 on Sidewinder Drive, Park City, Utah. (SH:15). There were 
two vehicles involved in the accident. Id. The vehicles had stopped off of the highway 
in the private parking lot of the Aspen Villa Apartments. (SH:27). Mr. Parkin was the 
complainant and driver of one of the vehicles. (SH: 15). Spencer testified that he first 
made contact with Mr. Parkin outside of his vehicle and detected the odor of marijuana 
coming from his person. (SH:16). He did not, however, inquire about the odor at that 
time. Id. Spencer did observe Mr. Parkin walking around for thirty minutes. (SH:37). 
Mr. Parkin did not have glassy, blood shot eyes. Id. He did not appear to be slurring his 
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words. Id. And he did not appear to be impaired in any manner. Id. Based on those 
observations Spencer did not believe Mr. Parkin was driving impaired, therefore he did 
not investigate into any D.U.I, violation. Id. 
As part of the accident investigation Spencer collected information from both 
drivers including their drivers license, registration, and insurance information. (SH:17). 
His investigation lasted approximately thirty minutes. Id. At the conclusion of his 
investigation Spencer cited the other driver and did not cite Mr. Parkin for any moving or 
equipment violation. (SH:17-18). At that time Spencer returned the culpable party's 
driver license, registration, citation, and insurance information before they left the scene. 
(SH:31). 
Next, Spencer requested Mr. Parkin to sit in his patrol car so that he could obtain 
some more information, such as the speed he was traveling pre and post impact, and so 
that he could print off all necessary information regarding the accident and the other 
driver's insurance information for Mr. Parkin. (SH: 18-19). Spencer testified that he 
again detected the odor of marijuana as Mr. Parkin sat in his patrol car. (SH:19). He 
continued to obtain information from Mr. Parkin and then concluded the accident 
investigation. Id. 
Immediately after concluding the accident investigation Spencer questioned Mr. 
Parkin about the odor of marijuana. Id. Mr. Parkin was still inside of the patrol car and 
Spencer retained his driver's license. (SH: 19, 21). Spencer testified that his overhead 
lights were flashing, he was in uniform, had a side arm but did not unholster it, nor did he 
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pull out his handcuffs or threaten Mr. Parkin. (SH: 19-20). Spencer told Mr. Parkin that 
he could smell marijuana on his person. (SH:35). Then, Spencer specifically asked Mr. 
Parkin whether "he had smoked any marijuana that day, or if he had been around 
anybody that had smoked marijuana that day." (SH:20,35). According to Spencer, Mr. 
Parkin responded that "he does have friends that smoke marijuana, [and] that he had not 
had any that day." Id. 
While questioning Mr. Parkin, Spencer did not inform him that he was free to 
leave, that he did not have to speak to him and that he did not have to consent to a search 
of his vehicle. (SH:32-33). The entire conversation inside of the patrol car lasted 
approximately ten minutes, including the conclusion of the accident investigation. 
(SH:33). Spencer testified that he wanted to perform a search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle 
based on the odor of marijuana, he stated, "[A]ny time I smell marijuana, I search the 
car." (SH:39). Based on the odor of marijuana and Mr. Parkin's denial to smoking, 
Spencer asked for Mr. Parkin's consent to the search of his vehicle to "make sure there 
wasn't any marijuana" in it. (SH:36). Mr. Parkin stated that "that would be fine with 
him." Id. 
Pursuant to the search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle Spencer discovered a small metal 
pipe that he believed to be consistent with marijuana use and a "jerky chew" can 
containing a green leafy substance which appeared to be marijuana. (SH:22). Spencer 
testified that as part of his training he learned how to determine "[the] smell of both pre 
burned and post burned marijuana, and the smoke while it is being burnt." (SH:44). 
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After discovering the marijuana and consistent marijuana paraphernalia, Spencer placed 
Mr. Parkin under arrest and called for backup to assist him in a more thorough search of 
the vehicle. (SH:22). At approximately 7:30 p.m. Trooper Jorgenson ("Jorgenson") of 
the Utah Highway Patrol was dispatched to the scene to assist Spencer in the search of 
the vehicle and also to perform an inventory search. (SH:3,5,9). Pursuant to the search 
Spencer and Jorgenson discovered bags of marijuana and a couple bags with white power 
residue, later determined to be cocaine. (SH:5). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by failing to rule on whether a Miranda violation occurred. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination provides that "no person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const, 
amend. V. The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
492 (1966), that a defendant must be informed of his or her Fifth Amendment right 
before being subject to a custodial interrogation. 
First, a Miranda violation occurred where Mr. Parkin was in custody and 
interrogated for Miranda purposes when he was questioned in Spencer's patrol car about 
the odor of marijuana without the procedural protection of a Miranda warning. Mr. 
Parkin was interrogated because Spencer asked questions that he knew were likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. Mr. Parkin was also in custody while he was 
interrogated. Several factors point towards custody including: that he was isolated in a 
police car with an officer accusing him of a crime, Spencer's questioning was accusatory, 
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there were no other people around, they were pulled off of the highway, and Mr. Parkin 
was the sole suspect of the investigation. Because Mr. Parkin was in custody and 
interrogated for Miranda purposes without a Miranda warning all statements he made 
should have been suppressed. The Miranda issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal 
therefore this Court should review it. 
Second, even if this Court finds that the Miranda issue was not specifically 
preserved for appeal this Court may still review it under the plain error doctrine because 
Mr. Parkin can establish that an error exists, that the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and that the error is harmful. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
Third, the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Parkin's consent was voluntarily 
and free of prior police illegality. Factors that lead to a conclusion of coercion include: 
Spencer accusing Mr. Parkin of committing a crime while isolated in his patrol car 
(SH:20,35); Spencer informing Mr. Parkin that he wanted to check the vehicle to make 
sure there was no marijuana in it (SH:36); and Spencer telling Mr. Parkin that he could 
smell marijuana on him (SH:36). Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the trial 
court erred when it found that Mr. Parkin's consent was clear and unequivocal. (R. 79-
86). Additionally, this Court should find that the consent was invalid and the evidence 
should have been suppressed based on the prior police illegality, specifically the Miranda 
violation. 
Finally, the trial court erred by failing to rule on whether an exigent circumstance 
existed. Under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, "[A] warrantless 
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automobile search requires probable cause and exigent circumstances unless it satisfies 
traditionally recognized justifications of protecting the safety of police or the public or 
preventing the destruction of evidence." State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699, 705, 2004 UT 95 
(Utah 2004). "[EJxigent circumstances exist when the car is movable, the occupants are 
alerted [to the presence of law enforcement], and the car's contents may never be found 
again if a warrant must be obtained." State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 
1996) (citations omitted). There were no exigent circumstances in this case because 
Spencer had ample time to obtain a search warrant or a telephonic warrant. Therefor, the 
warrantless search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle absent exigent circumstances violated his 
rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RULE ON 
WHETHER MR. PARKIN WAS IN CUSTODY AND INTERROGATED 
WITHOUT THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF A MIRANDA WARNING. 
A. ALL STATEMENTS MADE TO SPENCER SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY WERE THE PRODUCT 
OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND MR. PARKIN DID 
NOT RECEIVE A MIRANDA WARNING. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination provides that "no person 
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. 
amend. V. Police interrogation of a suspect in custody threatens the exercise of this Fifth 
Amendment privilege because of the potential danger that officers will compel 
confessions through overtly coercive interrogations. NY. v. Quarels, 467 U.S. 649, 654 
(1984). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that unless the defendant was 
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informed of his Fifth Amendment right before a custodial interrogation, any pretrial 
statements elicited from the defendant were inadmissible at trial. 384 U.S. at 492. The 
standard to determine whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is whether the 
individual's "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); see also State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 
1212 (Utah 1987). Interrogation is defined as "any words or actions on the part of the 
police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
Utah courts recognize four factors that must be evaluated to determine whether a 
suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes, "(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether objective indicia of arrest were 
present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation." State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 
998 (Utah Ct App. 1992); Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). 
Moreover, in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that the officer's "coercive or compulsive strategy" should be assessed in 
determining the interrogation factor of custody. The question of custody is determined 
based on an objective standard. "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in 
the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. at 442. 
Spencer interrogated Mr. Parkin for Miranda purposes when he asked questions 
that were likely to elicit an incriminating response. Spencer testified that he told Mr. 
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Parkin that he could smell marijuana on him. (SH:35). Then he asked if "he had smoked 
any marijuana that day or if he had been around anybody that had smoked marijuana that 
day." (SH:20). Spencer should have known that this would likely elicit an incriminating 
response because he was accusing Mr. Parkin of smoking marijuana. Spencer also asked 
if he could search Mr. Parkin's vehicle to make sure there was no marijuana in it. 
(SH:36). This question is equally as likely to elicit an incriminating response because it 
accuses Mr. Parkin of possessing an illegal substance in his vehicle. 
Additionally, Mr. Parkin was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time 
Spencer began interrogating him. Utah case law recognizes that a temporary detention 
with a limited purpose is not a custodial interrogation. Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 997. 
However, "at the point the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police 
officer's questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Id. at 998. The Utah 
Supreme Court has identified that investigative questioning turns accusatory when the 
"police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and also 
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has committed it." Carner, 664 P.2d at 
1171. 
The first Miranda factor, the site of the interrogation, strongly points toward 
custody because Mr. Parkin was questioned inside of a patrol car by a uniformed officer 
in a desolate parking lot. In Mirquet, this Court found that interrogation inside of a police 
car points toward custody. 844 P.2d at 999. This Court stated that the site is not "as free 
of compulsion as questioning on a sidewalk or outside of the police car." Id. And that 
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because the defendant pulled alongside the interstate "[he] was thus subject to a more 
police dominated setting than a citizen pulled over in an urban area where passing 
motorists are going slower and pedestrians are present." Id. The present case is similar 
to Mirquet because Mr. Parkin was questioned in a police car that was stopped off of the 
highway in a parking lot. There is no evidence in the record that other people were 
present or in the area. The evidence shows that the only other person at the scene, the 
culpable party from the accident, had already left before Mr. Parkin was questioned in 
Spencer's patrol car. (SH:31). Moreover, Spencer never told Mr. Parkin that he was free 
to leave or that he did not have to speak with him any further. (SH:32). 
The second factor, whether the investigation focused on the accused, likewise 
supports a finding of custody because Spencer was not questioning Mr. Parkin as part of 
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime; instead he was the only suspect of the 
investigation. 
The third factor, whether objective indicia of arrest were present, supports a 
finding of custody because Mr. Parkin was isolated in a patrol car with a uniformed 
officer accusing him of a crime. In Mirquet, this Court stated that". . . [the] defendant 
was isolated in a patrol vehicle with an officer accusing him of a crime. One element of 
any arrest is going to be such an accusation." 844 P.2d at 999. Likewise, Mr. Parkin was 
insolated in a patrol car with Spencer accusing him of a crime. Although there was no 
direct indicia of arrest such as handcuffs on the dashboard or a display of a gun, 
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Spencer's direct accusation that Mr. Parkin smoked marijuana and had some in his 
vehicle is sufficient indicia of arrest to constitute custody. 
Finally, the fourth factor, the length and form of interrogation, strongly leads to a 
conclusion of custody. In Mirquet, this Court held that the fourth factor strongly 
supported the trial court's determination of custody because Sergeant Mangelson stated, 
"[I]t's obvious to me that you've been smoking marijuana. Do you care to go get the 
marijuana for me, or do you want me to find it?" 844 P.2d at 1000. It also found that, 
Officer Mangelson testified that the moment he detected the aroma 
of marijuana there was no question in his mind whatsoever that the 
defendant had been smoking marijuana. At this point Officer 
Mangelson had reasonable grounds to believe both a crime had been 
committed and defendant had committed the crime. The questioning 
that followed was an attempt to get evidence to support that 
conclusion. The form of Officer Mangelson's question was not only 
likely to elicit an incriminating response, it precluded any 
nonincriminating response. This question manifested coercive 
intent. 
Id. Similarly, Spencer testified that he detected the odor of marijuana on Mr. Parkin 
when he first made contact with him. (SH: 16). He also testified that "[A]ny time I smell 
marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). At the point that Spencer detected the odor of 
marijuana on Mr. Parkin he had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been 
committed and that Mr. Parkin had committed it. See Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171. Spencer 
questioned Mr. Parkin in attempt to get evidence in support of his belief that there was 
marijuana in the vehicle. Spencer's testimony above indicates his coercive intent. 
Therefore the form of questioning was accusatory and elicited an incriminating response. 
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Viewing these factors in their totality, a reasonable person in Mr. Parkin's position 
would have believed that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated 
with formal arrest. Therefore, Mr. Parkin should have been provided a Miranda warning 
because he was in custody and interrogated by Spencer. The U.S. Supreme Court 
established the rule in Miranda specifically to prohibit this type of conscious disregard of 
a constitutional guarantee by an officer. Because the trial court failed to rule on this 
issue, Mr. Parkin asks this Court to decide the issue if presented with sufficient factual 
findings; in the alternative, Mr. Parkin asks this Court to remand the case to the trial court 
to rule on this issue and make the necessary findings and conclusions. 
B. THE MIRANDA ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR APPEAL. 
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim 
on appeal." State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citation 
omitted). Additionally, "the grounds for the objection must be distinctly and specifically 
stated." Id. 
The Miranda issue was preserved in the trial court by Mr. Parkin's Motion to 
Suppress and during the suppression hearing on the matter. (R. 41-6, 48-9). Moreover, 
the trial court made findings of fact consistent with findings to determine whether a 
custodial interrogation occurred. (R. 79-86). 
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Questioning by defense counsel to Spencer on cross examination during the 
suppression hearing supports a finding that the Miranda issue was preserved: whether his 
overhead lights were continuously on during both the traffic accident and criminal 
investigations; (SH:27) whether the culpable party to the accident had left the scene 
before he questioned Mr. Parkin in his patrol car; (SH:31) whether he told Mr. Parkin that 
he was free to leave; (SH:32) whether he told Mr. Parkin that he could smell marijuana 
on him; (SH:35) and if he could look in Mr. Parkin's vehicle to make sure there was no 
marijuana in it. (SH:36). 
Questioning to Spencer posed by the state also supports a finding that the Miranda 
issue was preserved: if he was dressed in his uniform; (SH:19) if he had a side arm on; 
(SH:20) if he ever unholstered the side arm or threatened Mr. Parkin; (SH:20) if he pulled 
out his handcuffs and put them on the dashboard or displayed them in any manner; 
(SH:20); whether Mr. Parkin had smoked marijuana that day, or if he been with friends 
that smoked marijuana; (SH:20) and whether he retained Mr. Parkin's drivers license 
while he questioned him. (SH:21). 
Moreover, the trial judge made the following findings of fact that are also 
consistent with a finding that the issue was preserved for appeal. 
2. Defendant's car was behind the other vehicle . . . and 
Spencer was behind both vehicles and [he] turned on his 
overhead emergency equipment, which remained on during the 
entire investigation. 
3. After talking to the other driver Spencer had defendant get 
into the patrol car and again Spencer could smell the same 
intensity of marijuana coming from defendant. 
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5. After concluding the accident investigation Spencer asked 
defendant about the odor of marijuana. Spencer asked 
defendant if he had been smoking marijuana and defendant said 
no. Spencer asked defendant if defendant had been around 
others who smoked marijuana and defendant said some of his 
friends smoked marijuana but that he had not smoked any that 
day. 
6. Spencer asked if there was any marijuana in defendant's 
vehicle and defendant said no, there was not. Spencer asked if 
he, defendant, minded if Spencer searched defendant's car to 
see if there was any marijuana. 
7. Spencer did not use any intimidating words or demeanor, 
Spencer was the only officer present, no weapons were drawn, 
no threats or promises were issued, and the conversation was in 
tone and tenor similar to the accident investigation. 
(R. 79-86). The trial judge's Conclusions of Law section of the Memorandum Decision 
also supports preservation of the issue. The trial judge concluded that, 
1. When Spencer asked defendant if he had been smoking 
marijuana defendant was then detained. Until that time, though a 
reasonable person would not feel free to leave. . . When Spencer 
shifted the focus of the investigation to a marijuana inquiry 
defendant was detained and not free to leave. 
4. The request to search was not issued by Spencer until Spencer 
asked if defendant had been smoking marijuana. Defendant 
stated no, and in answer to another question defendant stated his 
friends had smoked marijuana. That statement was some 
corroboration of the odor Spencer smelled. The detection of the 
odor does not stand uncorroborated. 
(R. 79-86). 
Although the aforementioned facts and conclusions of law were ultimately used to 
conclude whether the defendant was "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes, they are 
also determinative factors in support of a finding that Spencer was subject to a custodial 
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interrogation for Miranda purposes. Even though the Miranda issue was not specifically 
raised in the trial court, the claims of error were sufficiently preserved by the questions 
posed by defense counsel and the state, as well as the trial judge's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Therefore, this Court should find that the Miranda issue was 
sufficiently preserved for appeal. 
POINT II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT MAY STILL 
REVIEW THE MIRANDA ISSUE ON APPEAL UNDER THE PLAIN 
ERROR DOCTRINE. 
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. "If any one of these requirements is not met, 
plain error is not established." Id. "To show obviousness of the error, [a defendant] must 
show that the law was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 6, 
19 P.3d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Assuming this Court does not find that the Miranda issue was preserved below, it 
should be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. First, as set forth above, an error 
occurred where Spencer failed to Mirandize Mr. Parkin before interrogating him while he 
was in custody. This error violated law established in Miranda and Carner. The United 
States Supreme Court decided Miranda in 1966 and the Utah Supreme Court decided 
Carner in 1983. These cases were well established before Mr. Parkin's Motion to 
Suppress and Memorandum in Support was argued and denied by the trial court. (R. 41-
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6, 79-86). Therefor, this Court should find that the trial court's failure to rule on the 
Miranda violation establishes the first prong of the plain error doctrine, that an error 
exists. 
Next, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. It is well established 
that Miranda arose out of the concern that "coercion inherent in custodial interrogations 
unacceptably raises the risk that a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination might be 
violated." U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004). It is also established that an 
interrogation occurs where "any words or actions on the part of the police that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Utah law establishes that a temporary investigation is not a per se 
custodial interrogation, however, "at the point the environment becomes custodial or 
accusatory, a police officer's questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." 
Carner, 664 P.2d at 1169. 
The trial court should have been alerted to the error when Spencer testified that 
"[A]ny time I smell marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). At that point the trial court 
should have determined that Spencer had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had 
been committed and that Mr. Parkin is the person who committed it. Carner, 664 P.2d at 
1171. Based on the foregoing, the second prong of the plain error doctrine is met because 
the Miranda violation should have been obvious to the trial court. 
Finally, Mr. Parkin must show that without the error, there was a reasonable 
likelihood that the case would have been decided differently in the trial court. See State 
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v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (the prejudice analysis considers whether 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome below). If the trial court 
would have ruled on the Miranda issue it would have found that Mr. Parkin was subject 
to a custodial interrogation without the protections of a Miranda warning; therefor it 
would have suppressed all statements made by Mr. Parkin. Had the trial court made such 
a ruling it would have also found that Mr. Parkin's consent was the result of police 
coercion; therefor it would have also granted Mr. Parkin's Motion to Suppress. Without 
the physical evidence it is highly likely that the state would have dismissed Mr. Parkin's 
case. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT 
MR. PARKIN'S CONSENT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY 
GIVEN; THEREFOR THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
In the absence of a warrant, when a defendant is subject to police illegality, and 
his or her rights are violated, for the subsequent search to be valid it is the state's burden 
to prove that the consent to search was (1) voluntary and (2) there was no police 
exploitation of a prior illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah 1990). 
Consent is not voluntary if it is given under duress, coercion or threat. State v. Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, 644-65 (Utah 2002). In addition, consent is not valid when it 
is obtained by a police exploitation of a prior illegality. Id. at 665. Such exploitation 
exists when the consent is insufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure. State v. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Factors to consider in the 
exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the illegality and consent, the 
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presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. Id. The state must establish that the consent was sufficiently attenuated 
from the illegal detention. Id. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT MR. PARKIN'S 
CONSENT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN WITHOUT 
COERCION. 
In the instant case, no search warrant was issued and Mr. Parkin's consent was not 
voluntary because it was given as a result of police coercion. As stated above, Spencer's 
coercive and compulsive strategies lead to a conclusion that Mr. Parkin was in custody. 
These coercive and compulsive strategies also lead to a conclusion that Spencer coerced 
Mr. Parkin into consenting to the search of his vehicle. 
It is well settled under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 that a 
search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable, 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All U.S. 218 (1973). One exception to the warrant 
requirement is free and voluntary consent. Id. When consent is relied upon to justify a 
warrantless search, the government has the burden of proving that the consent was, in 
fact, freely and voluntarily given. Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). Consent 
is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or coercion or express or 
implied." State v. Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073, 2001 UT 99,147 (Utah 2001). "The 
appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, 
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and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
atf56. 
Factors that may indicate a lack of duress or coercion include: "(1) the absence of 
a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by 
the officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the [property]; 
and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the party of the officer." Bisner, 2001 UT at 
147. 
In the instant case, the trial court erred by finding Mr. Parkin's consent was free of 
coercion. The question of whether consent was voluntary is a question of law reviewed 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's findings. Bisner, 2001 UT at f 42. 
Spencer coerced Mr. Parkin's consent by showing authority, accusing Mr. Parkin of 
smoking marijuana and possessing marijuana in his vehicle, and commanding a search so 
that he could ensure that there was no marijuana in the vehicle. Spencer specifically 
showed authority by commanding to search the vehicle to make sure there was no 
marijuana in it after telling Mr. Parkin that he could smell it on his person. (SH:36). And 
also by accusing Mr. Parkin of a crime while he was isolated in Spencer's patrol car. 
(SH:20,35). Moreover, Spencer asked for consent immediately after accusing Mr. Parkin 
of committing crimes. (SH:39). 
Although Spencer did not claim that he could search the vehicle without consent; 
he also failed to inform Mr. Parkin that he was free to leave or free to decline consent. 
(SH:32-33). Thus, while some factors may indicate a lack of coercion a review of the 
22 
totality of the circumstances indicate Spencer used coercion to obtain consent to search. 
He showed authority and demanded cooperation by Mr. Parkin. Therefor, the trial court 
erred by finding that Mr. Parkin's consent was given voluntary and free of coercion. 
B. THE SEARCH OF MR. PARKIN'S VEHICLE WAS NOT VALID 
BECAUSE IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS A RESULT OF PRIOR 
POLICE ILLEGALITY. 
In addition to Mr. Parkin's consent being involuntary it was also obtained through 
police exploitation of the prior illegality, specifically the Miranda violation. First, the 
temporal proximity between the illegality and the consent occurred simultaneously. Any 
consent Mr. Parkin gave occurred while he was in custody and interrogated without a 
Miranda warning. Secondly, there were no intervening circumstances that occurred 
between the illegal custody and interrogation and the search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle. The 
search occurred within minutes of the Miranda violation. (SH:36). Finally, the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct was severe. The purpose of excluding evidence 
obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights is to defer future illegalities. 
Hansen, 63 P.3d at 665 (the exclusionary rule is "to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way- by removing the incentive to disregard 
it") (citing Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975)). 
In the instant case, Spencer observed Mr. Parkin for approximately thirty minutes 
before he started interrogating him. (SH:37). He noticed that Mr. Parkin did not have 
glassy, blood shot eyes, and he did not slur his speech. Id. The only reason Spencer 
interrogated Mr. Parkin was based on the odor of marijuana. Id. After failing to observe 
23 
any criminal behavior and determining not to cite Mr. Parkin, Spencer should have let 
him on his way. (SH:17-18, 35). Instead, Spencer made a conscious decision to 
interrogate Mr. Parkin and search his vehicle after obtaining consent. (SH:36). Because 
Mr. Parkin's consent to the search of his vehicle was both involuntary and tainted by the 
prior police illegality, any evidence obtained as a result of the search should be 
suppressed as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
While it is clear that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been held to 
apply to Fourth Amendment violations, it should be equally obvious that a Fifth 
Amendment Miranda violation engaged in by law enforcement, specifically with the 
intent to obtain consent to conduct the questioned search, is the very type of prior police 
illegality that this Court should and ought to deter, as per Hansen. Mr. Parkin 
specifically requests that this Court apply a Hansen exploitation analysis focused on the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda violation occurring in this matter as the very police illegality 
that should and ought to be deterred. 
POINT IV. THE SEARCH OF MR. PARKIN'S VEHICLE WAS INVALID 
BECAUSE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED. 
Under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, "[A] warrantless automobile 
search requires probable cause and exigent circumstances unless it satisfies traditionally 
recognized justifications of protecting the safety of police or the public or preventing the 
destruction of evidence." Brake, 103 P.3d at 705 (citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
469-70 (Utah 1990); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,412 (Utah 1984); State v. Limb, 
581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). Moreover, "[t]he considerations requiring a showing of 
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exigent circumstances under the automobile exception seem to apply with equal force to 
the search of a vehicle based on an officer detecting the odor of marijuana." State v. 
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 973 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "[E]xigent circumstances exist 
when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted [to the presence of law enforcement], 
and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237. 
The search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle was unconstitutional because there were no 
exigent circumstances. In State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) this 
Court held that exigent circumstances existed because: defendant's vehicle was movable, 
he was alerted to the officers' presence, if Trooper Swain left to procure a warrant the 
defendant could have disposed of the contraband, and Trooper Swain could not access a 
magistrate to obtain a telephonic warrant. And in State v. Morck, this Court held that 
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the defendants' truck based on 
the following facts: the encounter between the defendants and the police occurred close 
to midnight on a dirt road in a remote area, a tow-truck was coming to get the truck, the 
defendants were not under arrest and could have gone with the tow-truck and removed 
any incriminating items. 821 P.2d at 1194. This Court also found that the officers could 
not have obtained a telephonic warrant due to location of a pay phone and radio contact. 
Id. 
The instant case, no exigency existed because Mr. Parkin was the complainant 
who called police dispatch and requested an officer to investigate the traffic accident. 
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(SH:15). Even though his vehicle was movable and he was alerted to the officer's 
presence, there was no exigency because he requested the officer to the scene and 
expected him to perform an investigation. 
Moreover, there was no threat that the contents would not be found if a warrant 
was obtained because Spencer could have easily obtained either a search warrant or a 
telephonic warrant. Almost immediately after Spencer arrived at the scene he smelled the 
odor of marijuana coming from Mr. Parkin. (SH:16). He did not investigate the odor at 
that time although he knew that he would eventually. Id. Spencer testified that "[A]ny 
time I smell marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). Instead, he spent thirty minutes 
investigating the accident before inquiring about the odor. (SH:36). Because Spencer 
detected the odor when he first arrived he could have attempted to obtain a search 
warrant by requesting another officer to take over the traffic accident investigation while 
he located a magistrate to issue a warrant based on his sworn affidavit. Or he could have 
obtained a telephonic warrant. Spencer did not face any of the problems preventing him 
from obtaining a telephonic warrant like the officers in Maycock and Morck. Spencer 
was in a residential area in Park City where cell phone coverage is plentiful. And his 
radio was working properly, as evidenced by his call to dispatch to send Trooper 
Jorgenson to assist in the search. Because he did not attempt to locate a magistrate to 
obtain a telephonic warrant it is unknown if one was available; however, it is likely a 
magistrate would have been available given that the search occurred on a Monday in the 
early evening. 
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Therefore, this Court should find that the search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle violated 
his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution where there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. As a result all evidence should 
be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Moreover, because the trial court failed to 
rule on this issue, Mr. Parkin asks this Court to rule on the issue; or in the alternative, to 
remand the case to the trial court to make the necessary findings and conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore Appellant Jason Parkin prays that this Court find that there was a 
Miranda violation and suppress his statements; and also find that his consent was 
involuntary and obtained as a result of police illegality, therefore suppress the evidence; 
and also find that there no exigent circumstances existed and the warrantless search of his 
vehicle was in violation of his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
therefore suppress the physical evidence as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
SUBMITTED this 30th day of October 2006. 
BRENT GOLD 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON B. PARKIN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 041500254 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: December 14, 2005 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An Information was filed on December 17, 2004, charging 
defendant with a Class A misdemeanor offense of possession of 
marijuana and a Class A misdemeanor offense of possession of drug 
paraphernalia and a third degree felony of possession of cocaine. 
After a preliminary hearing held May 3, 2005, the case was bound 
over. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on August 15, 2005. 
An evidentiary hearing was conducted August 22, 2005. The court 
heard the evidence and set a briefing schedule. Oral argument was 
scheduled for October 11, 2005, but continued on two occasions by 
counsel for various reasons. Argument was heard December 13, 
2005, and the court took the matter under advisement and now 
issues its ruling. 
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The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, heard 
the testimony, reviewed the entire file, and concludes as 
follows. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 6, 2004, defendant was involved in a vehicle 
accident on SR 248. The Utah Highway Patrol was called afterward 
and arrived approximately 6:30 p.m. 
2. Upon arrival UHP Trooper Spencer (Spencer) encountered 
defendant and Spencer immediately detected the odor of raw 
marijuana emanating from defendant. That was outside the 
vehicles. No discussion or comment occurred about that 
observation by Spencer. Defendant did not appear in any way to 
be impaired according to the observations of Spencer, either in 
speech, appearance, movement or functioning. Defendant's car was 
behind the other vehicle involved in the accident and Spencer was 
behind both vehicles and Spencer turned on his overhead emergency 
equipment, which remained on during the entire investigation. 
3. Spencer conducted the accident investigation and talked 
with the other driver and with defendant. Spencer collected 
information, including driver licenses, registration, insurance, 
and had defendant and the other driver fill out statements. 
After talking to the other driver Spencer had defendant get into 
the patrol car and again Spencer could smell the same intensity 
of raw marijuana smell coming from defendant. Defendant was in 
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the vehicle approximately ten minutes, most of which was involved 
in concluding the accident investigation. 
4. Spencer did not cite defendant for the accident but cited 
the other driver. 
5. After concluding the accident investigation Spencer asked 
defendant about the odor of marijuana. Spencer asked defendant 
if he had been smoking marijuana and defendant said no. Spencer 
asked defendant if defendant had been around others who smoked 
marijuana and defendant said some of his friends smoked marijuana 
but that he had not smoked any that day. 
6. Spencer asked if there was any marijuana in defendant's 
vehicle and defendant said no, there was not. Spencer asked if 
he, defendant, minded if Spencer searched defendant's car to see 
if there was any marijuana. Defendant said Spencer could look. 
The request to search came within one minute of asking about the 
odor of marijuana. 
7. Spencer did not tell defendant he could deny permission 
to search. Spencer did not use any intimidating words or 
demeanor, Spencer was the only officer present, no weapons were 
drawn, no threats or promises were issued, and the conversation 
was in tone and tenor similar to the accident investigation that 
had been on-going for approximately 30 minutes. 
7. Spencer looked in the car and found items of drug 
paraphernalia and arrested defendant and placed defendant in the 
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police vehicle. 
8. The vehicle was impounded and an inventory search was 
conducted and it revealed the items that are the subject of this 
motion. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant was involved in a consensual encounter until 
the conclusion of the accident investigation. Law enforcement 
had been called to investigate an accident scene. The accident 
investigation was not a detention. When Spencer asked defendant 
if he had been smoking marijuana defendant was then detained. 
Until that time, though a reasonable person would not feel free 
to leave, while the accident investigation was on-going the 
encounter was consensual because law enforcement had been invited 
to participate, that is, investigate the accident. When Spencer 
shifted the focus of the investigation to a marijuana inquiry 
defendant was detained and was not free to leave. At that point 
the encounter was not consensual. 
2. The detention, to be lawful, must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion. The investigation must be tailored to last 
no longer than is necessary to either confirm or dispel the 
suspicion. The scope of the investigation must be related to the 
nature and degree of the suspicion. 
3. The odor of a controlled substance, raw marijuana, known 
to trained law enforcement officers normally, emanating from 
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defendant amounts to reasonable suspicion to question whether the 
person had marijuana and justifies a request for permission to 
conduct a search. When an officer smells raw marijuana he is 
entitled to, and would be derelict to fail to, inquire about the 
source of the odor. Defendant argues that if there was an odor 
about the area the office should have investigated that first and 
Spencer's explanation about the odor is obviously not credible 
because Spencer did not undertake the controlled substance 
investigation until after the accident investigation. The court 
cannot and does not second guess an officer as to the 
reasonableness of his investigative methods. If there was 
reasonable suspicion that justified a temporary detention to 
investigate the odor or marijuana, the order in which such 
investigation occurs is not relevant. 
4. The detention was reasonable because there was reasonable 
articulable suspicion to justify it. The odor of marijuana 
amounted to a suspicion that justified the further detention and 
the questions about use and the request to search. The scope of 
the investigation was short, limited directly to inquiry about 
the source of the odor and a request to search. The request to 
search was not issued by Spencer until Spencer asked if defendant 
had been smoking marijuana. Defendant stated no, and in answer 
to another question defendant stated his friends had smoked 
marijuana. That statement was some corroboration of the odor 
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Spencer smelled. The detection of the odor does not stand 
uncorroborated. Further, even without such corroboration, the 
court concludes the detection of the odor of marijuana, by 
itself, by a trained officer, while not amounting to probable 
cause, does amount to reasonable suspicion that justifies a 
request to search a vehicle. 
5. Defendant was detained after the accident was fully 
investigated for a very brief time, under three minutes, until 
the consent was sought and obtained. 
6. The consent was freely and voluntarily given and is not 
attacked other than as to being tainted by the alleged illegal 
detention. There was a clear and unequivocal request to search 
the vehicle by Spencer and a clear and unequivocal response by 
defendant that Spencer could search in the vehicle. Spencer 
stated by his question he believed drugs were in the vehicle. 
7. There was no duress or coercion, express or implied, in 
the conduct of Spencer. 
8. The totality of the circumstances show the consent was 
freely and voluntarily given without coercion. There was no 
illegal detention that tainted the consent. The validity of the 
consent is not challenged in terms of voluntariness but it is 
said to be tainted by the illegal detention. The court has found 
and concluded there was no illegal detention. 
9. The search and resulting seizure of contraband was lawful 
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under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The motion to suppress is DENIED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
The clerk of the court is to place this case on the criminal 
calendar for a status conference and the setting of a trial date. 
DATED th is C± d*y Qf \\(7 l , 2005, 
BY THE Ot)URT: 
a-U (s L LA 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT J 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
